Afghanistan Is Not Iraq … Just Ask the Afghan People - KARL W. EIKENBERRY

The  recently manifested massive failure of America's intervention in Iraq has led outside observers to speculate that the ongoing rapid drawdown of international military forces in Afghanistan will lead to similar chaos in that country.

Three striking differences are evident when comparing results.  First, the Afghan people have a far higher degree of trust in their security forces -- army and police -- than do their Iraqi counterparts. Some 86 percent of the Afghan people interviewed in this year's Asia Foundation survey expressed confidence in their national army, and 73 percent in their national police force. The degree of confidence is contingent upon levels of local violence, but is generally favorable and improving across the country.

The Afghan government, United States, and international military coalition have remained committed since early 2002 to building national security forces whose ranks reflect the ethnic composition of the country, emphasizing accountability, and resisting occasional political urges to field large scale militias.

Second, while almost all of the Afghan people are victimized by government and societal corruption (some 62 percent report it as a major problem in their daily lives), this year an impressive 75 percent say the national government does a somewhat good or very good job, and about two-thirds indicate that their provincial governments are doing a good job (67 percent), followed by municipal authorities (58 percent) and district governments (56 percent).

Stanford professor Francis Fukuyama has written that political power is not just a result of the resources and numbers of citizens that a society can command but also the degree to which the legitimacy of leaders and institutions is recognized. Afghanistan's government structure does enjoy foundational legitimacy, albeit still weak and fragile. The Iraq government, by comparison, is resting on quicksand.

Third, and last, Afghan citizens are surprisingly optimistic, with 54 percent saying the country is moving in the right direction; though this number is down slightly from last year, in spite of annual fluctuations, the long-term trend since 2006 is upward. 

Afghanistan's post-Taliban and Iraq's post-Saddam destinies are both uncertain. We know that without the continuation of significant levels of foreign developmental aid and security assistance, the Afghan state will likely collapse. Even with continued external support, the future is problematic, though the country, government, and security forces are more cohesive than many outsiders realize. 

However, while admitting that we can't predict either of the countries' fates, we should not -- in our frustration with the disappointing results of two protracted difficult wars -- conclude the situations are identical, and that both are illustrations of the folly of industrial strength American interventionism.  In Iraq, unquestionably the United States has contributed to a good part of the chaos there today.

In Afghanistan, on the other hand, our actions have helped end years of brutal civil war and overturn a feudal regime that imprisoned half of its population and rejected scientific learning. In coming decades, historians with the benefit of full access to the archives and the dispassion that only comes with time, may conclude that the United States spent far too much of its treasure in Afghanistan after 9/11 and that the strategic opportunity costs were excessive. Yet, those decisions -- whether right or wrong -- were made some time ago.  

The Afghan people, though, are still today saying that they believe in the state, security institutions, and future that they, with much help and sacrifice from the United States and international community, have helped to create.   Read More at Foreign Policy