The Fall of the Monarchy and Afghanistan -- Carlo Jose Vicente Caro

The Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction recently wrote that the Taliban now controlled more territory than any time since 2001. This hard assessment is evidence that a military solution to this matter is futile. While a foreign solution might have been possible back in 2002, the time for this died with the King on July 23rd, 2007.

On the 11th of June, 2002, a Loya Jirga was held to transfer power to the Afghan Transitional Authority. While King Mohammed Zahir Shah had considerable support from the delegates, the United States decided to back Hamid Karzai instead.

Had the Bush administration not sidelined the King, these last 15 years might have been much different for Afghanistan. Indeed, the fall of the Monarchy in Afghanistan marked the downfall of the country.

Back in the coup of July 17, 1973, Afghan republicans and communists had put an end to a system, which despite its defects, had achieved a certain degree of stability and democratic progress not known before in the history of their country.

Indeed, between the early 1950s and 1973, Afghanistan with its beautiful landscapes, saw an increasing number of schools, doctors, teachers, and tourists in the country. And even though by the early 1970s, King Mohammed Zahir Shah had lost much of his political significance, the monarchy had been the only institution that had enjoyed the recognition and acceptance of political authority from a population divided along tribal, ethnic, and religious lines.

Afghan Kings had always been the main champions of the modernization processes of the country and had been supported by both tribal and religious leaders, as long as their power was not significantly threatened.

In the rush to achieve national unity, Mohammed Zahir Shah and his predecessors were always conscious of the need to integrate the country’s different ethnicities and to avoid the exclusive domain of power by the Pashtuns. The monarchy also enjoyed the advantage of being Pashtun, which at least in theory guaranteed the support of the main ethnicity.

If we exclude the period of King Amanullah Khan, the monarchy was always careful to avoid a confrontation with traditional norms or religious values, and this had paved the way for the Southern tribes to recognize their legitimacy.

The different Pashtun revolts that Mohammed Zahir Shah had to deal with had always been of a local nature or had been restricted to internal tribal interests. Indeed, these revolts were never supported by the great tribal leaders of the time.

But the Afghan Kings still viewed the tribes as a threat to their own authority and sought to force them to participate in the central government.

The monarchy also defended the rest of the ethnicities from discrimination. It promoted the integration of the Tajiks and other non-Pashtun peoples to important positions of the government. This gave the monarchy a great deal of respect from minorities, which viewed it as a break to Pashtun hegemony.

It is complicated to control the religious establishment in Afghanistan because Sunni Islam does not have a hierarchy and it is rather decentralized. This situation is made even worse because of topography.

But the monarchs still maneuvered around such complications. King Mohammed Nadir Shah tried to control and organize the body of the ulema, thinking that if it had some sort of structure then it would be easier to control.

He gave the ulema positions of power like in the sphere of justice, but never weakened the authority of the State. Since these reforms were implemented gradually the ulema accepted them and did not perceive the actions of the King as threatening Islam.

Then from the 1930s, his son, Mohammed Zahir Shah, advocated secular education and began the creation of a network of state madrassas to control the formation of the ulema.

He sought to construct a religious body that was more progressive and open to reforms. Of course, given the complexity, the successes of these policies were relative.

State madrassas were in urban centers, while traditional ones were all over the country. The ulema in traditional centers were therefore always the majority and the historical weakness of the Afghan state made it difficult to extend itself to rural areas.

In 1964, a 455 member Loya Jirga approved a new constitution. But Mohammed Zahir Shah’s desire to transform Afghanistan into a modern parliamentary monarchy was presenting to be much more difficult than expected.

The causes of the failure include the absence of a clear political ideology to orient the democratic process, political tensions triggered by Islamists and Communists, and the inability of traditional society to adapt to a modern political system.

The religious establishment passively accepted the secular nature of the new 1964 constitution because of the existence of state madrassas, the presence of Islamic experts and the King’s influence.

From 1964, the law guaranteed freedom of speech and freedom of thought as well as equality before the law. While these liberties were more theoretical than real, they were nevertheless an important advancement in the history of Afghanistan. - Read More

The Fall of the Monarchy and Afghanistan - International Policy Digest

International Policy Digest