OPINION: WHERE WE WENT WRONG, FROM AFGHANISTAN TO ISIS - MARK MOYAR

This article first appeared on the Hoover Institution site.

Strategic defeat often results from an accumulation of tactical failures. Repeated battlefield setbacks can destroy an adversary’s capabilities, as befell Napoleonic France, or its will, as befell Britain in the American War of Independence.

In such cases, military organizations may deserve at least some of the blame for the strategic loss, because in most countries the military leadership bears primary responsibility for training, equipping and commanding armed forces, functions that are fundamental to tactical effectiveness.

Military strategy, by contrast, is often set by civilian leaders, and in the case of the United States it is the statutory prerogative of the civilian commander in chief.
When a country enjoys tactical military success as consistently as the United States, responsibility for strategic success must rest primarily with those who make strategy.

The American military could be held culpable for recent strategic setbacks were it highly influential in the crafting of strategy. But its influence under the Bush administration was much more limited, and under the Obama administration its strategic advice has largely been ignored.

A review of America’s military interventions since 2001 reveals that seven broad errors account for America’s inability to turn tactical successes into strategic victories. In every instance, the error was the direct result of presidential decisions on policy or strategy. Some of those decisions ran in direct contradiction of the military’s advice. - Read More at the Newsweek

Where We Went Wrong, From Afghanistan to ISIS

The White House's Seven Deadly Errors | Hoover Institution - More