The diplomat - The Troubled US-Afghanistan Legacy --- Unrealistic expectations, mismanagement and uncooperative neighbors have complicated U.S. involvement in Afghanistan. --- Combat operations in Afghanistan will finally be over at the end of 2014, and the last American soldier will leave by the end of 2016. This will not be the first time Afghans will be left to fend for themselves. -- Despite being the longest war in its history, the U.S. led war in Afghanistan could neither stabilize the country or the South Asian region in general. Undue expectations, harsh terrain, and unruly neighbors are the main reasons the U.S. and its coalition partners could not achieve their objectives. With other security hot spots opening up in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan now looks destined to take a back seat. The U.S. gains in Afghanistan (dismantling al-Qaeda , training Afghan forces, female education and establishing a democratic process) look modest, especially when viewed in terms of both human and capital losses. --- War Mismanagement -- Lack of coordination among U.S. and coalition agencies was the norm rather than the exception. Even a tiny forward operating base would typically have representatives from many U.S. agencies, such as the State Department, USAID, the Department of Agriculture, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Some of them inadvertently worked against the mission and undermined the local battlespace owner. -- The mission in Afghanistan was never clearly defined by the White House or the Pentagon. Ground commanders had little understanding of their stated goals, and they were unsure how to achieve their objectives. With changes in leadership, the mission switched between enemy combat, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and nation building. And until recently, there was no exit strategy. -- Prosecution of the war was hamstrung by a lack of knowledge of the local language, religion and culture. The infamous Quran-burning incident at one of the U.S. bases was a direct result of this ignorance. Marines typically served for nine months and Army soldiers for ten months, and every time they rotated, operational continuity was broken. -- Just like Russia in 1980s, the U.S. also depended heavily on the concept of “security bubbles” to fight the war. The security perimeter was concentrated on population centers (a population–centric counterinsurgency) and U.S. commanders paid local Afghan commanders to buy their protection and loyalty. The periphery was left to the Taliban, who operated freely and attacked coalition forces from the outside. -- More, Asim Yousafzai, http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/the-troubled-us-afghanistan-legacy/