Donald Trump is doing better on Afghanistan than his predecessor - The Economist

A ONCE-popular argument that President Donald Trump’s approach to foreign policy is not substantially different from Barack Obama’s is going down in a blaze of trade agreements. Yet on Afghanistan it remains broadly true. Mr Obama came to power describing Afghanistan’s conflict as the “war we have to win”, but never seemed convinced that that was possible. After a stab at escalating the conflict, he devoted his presidency to ending it. It was time, he said in 2011, the year the war became the longest in American history, “to focus on nation-building here at home.” Mr Trump has long said the same. His decision to launch a much smaller escalation last year came with the closest thing he can muster to an apology attached: “My original instinct was to pull out, and historically I like to follow my instincts.” Even so, his record on Afghanistan, including this week a promise of peace talks to add to that modest military reinforcement, is starting to look much better than his predecessor’s.

This chiefly reflects what a low bar Mr Obama set. Reluctantly persuaded that withdrawal from Afghanistan would spell defeat, as the Taliban rushed to seize the territory vacated by over 100,000 Western troops, Mr Obama left 8,000 behind to hold the line. But with the Taliban controlling or contesting 70% of the country, the largely incompetent Afghan army flailing, and the Americans bound by strict rules of engagement, it was unclear how they could. At the request of his generals, who may fear the strategic impact of defeat in Afghanistan as much as the prospect of it again falling into the hands of foreign terrorists, Mr Trump grudgingly agreed to send 3,500 reinforcements. He also relaxed the rules and increased American air strikes, military trainers and mentoring of front-line Afghan troops. He presented these changes as a rebuke to his predecessor. They might alternatively be seen as an acceptance of Mr Obama’s shrivelled ambition—to stave off defeat in Afghanistan until the Afghan government can fend for itself—and a modest attempt to make that achievable.

Unsurprisingly, then, Mr Trump’s measures have not transformed the battlefield, where the Taliban remain in the ascendant. Instead of encouraging the Afghan government to take back territory, America is reported to be urging it to withdraw from remote outposts to reduce casualties. The level of violence continues to be horrifying, especially among civilians. More were killed in the first six months of this year than in any previous year on record, in part because of increased American bombing. Yet there is at least more confidence that the Taliban can be prevented from taking a major town. And the 315,000-strong Afghan armed forces are said to be improving. Compared with the debacle Mr Trump inherited, this represents progress.

Revelations that a senior American diplomat, Alice Wells, met Taliban representatives in Qatar last month are also encouraging. America and its Afghan ally have been keen to negotiate with the insurgents since the demise of Mr Obama’s short-lived surge confirmed their inability to end the war militarily. But they have generally insisted that the government must lead that effort. Meanwhile the Taliban, to underline that their foremost demand is the withdrawal of foreign troops, say they will only speak to America. It is therefore notable that Ms Wells’s meeting appears to have taken place without any Afghan official present. That represents an overdue acknowledgment by America that the Taliban are formidable enough to set negotiating terms. It also implies an admission that America is not merely the benevolent instrument of Afghans’ democratic will it claims to be, but an independent actor in a multi-layered civil conflict, whose continued presence in Afghanistan is a legitimate subject of debate.

This is still a far cry from offering Mr Trump a way out. Stitched together by British imperialists in the late 19th century, Afghanistan’s feuding ethnic groups have never shared power uncoerced, and 40 years of on-off civil war have made them even more reluctant to. The government is deeply divided along ethnic lines. It is hard to imagine how its members might accommodate the Taliban—even if they want to be accommodated. It is unclear that the mullahs have given up on a military victory. It is even unclear which faction of the Taliban, the fundamentalist leadership or the more pragmatic rump, their representatives in Qatar might speak for. If Mr Trump does view the putative talks as a means to declare victory and quit Afghanistan, as some suspect, he has simply given up on the place.

If the president still wants to avoid that, however, he can probably do so indefinitely. The war has cost America a trillion dollars—more in real terms than it spent on rebuilding Europe under the Marshall Plan—and the lives of 2,300 troops. Yet its current cost—roughly $45bn and around a dozen lives a year—is modest enough to invite little interest from Congress or the media. That suggests Mr Trump’s strategy is sustainable. - Read More

Donald Trump is doing better on Afghanistan than his ... - The Economist

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