An American Provocation: U.S. Foreign Policy during the Soviet-Afghanistan War - Kyle Tadman

American President Jimmy Carter and the foreign policies of his administration towards Afghanistan between the spring of 1979 and the beginning of 1981 paved the way for more than a decade of U.S. intervention in the Soviet-Afghanistan War. As the political situation quickly deteriorated in Afghanistan during the last year of the 1970s, the President and his policy advisors began to pay considerably more attention to the Soviet Union’s presence in the Southwest Asian country than it had during their first years in office.  In doing so, Carter and his men spent much of their time trying to establish a comprehensive strategy for addressing the increasingly hostile political and military climate in light of the Soviet’s occupation of the country. Within this context, the research illustrates how President Carter and members of his staff developed a foreign policy that was aimed towards influencing the outcome of the Soviet Union’s latest encroachment across national boundaries during the final two years of the administration.1

This article will examine a handful of important points, starting with why the United States got involved in this particular confrontation in the first place.  It will also analyze President Carter’s immediate public reaction to the Red Army’s invasion and whether or not his administration was genuinely “surprised” by the Soviet Politburo’s actions, considering the two nations were in a seemingly endless “Cold War” at the time of the invasion.2   In doing so, the research illustrates how the response to the Politburo’s chess move by the decision-makers in Washington, D.C. was ultimately highlighted by the use of the American spy network to carry out the country’s foreign policy in this long conflict. The foreign policy initiatives set forth by the Carter administration following the invasion, were actually put in motion much earlier.

In examining the policy-making process during this two-year period, the analysis will also expose the differences of opinion between the administration’s lead advisors—National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—on how best to address the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan.  It then recounts the two policy-makers’ ability to work through their contrasting viewpoints in route to the Carter administration’s overall response.  Most importantly however, this discussion will explain when the United States government began helping the Mujahidin forces confront the Soviet Army.  It reveals how the Brzezinski-led NSC ultimately won favor over President Carter during this deliberative period, and in doing so, opened the door for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to take a leading role inside Afghanistan six months before the Soviets invaded this geopolitically important country.3 Read More at Western Illinois Historical Review © 2013
Zbigniew Brzezinski How the US provoked the Soviet Union …

U.S., NATO Poised For Most Massive War In Afghanistan … Global Research